This paper builds a model to show how increases in aggregate uncertainty -an uncertainty shock -can generate recessions. Uncertainty shocks in the model are able to both account for a significant portion of business cycle fluctuations observed in data and generate positive comovements between output, consumption, investment, and hours. The key assumption of the model is that firm managers endogenously choose what projects to undertake and that the menu of these projects lies on a positively sloped mean-variance frontier -high-return projects are also high-risk projects. In times of high aggregate uncertainty, managers choose to undertake low-risk projects, and thus low-return projects, which in turn leads to a recession. Moreover, the model also matches various stylized facts about time series and cross-sectional variations in TFP and suggests shortcomings in using TFP data to calculate exogenous TFP shocks.
Introduction
There is increasing evidence for the negative correlation between measures of economic activity and measures of uncertainty. For example, the correlation between the second moment of aggregate TFP, a measure of uncertainty, and real GDP is negative. In this paper, I construct a model where exogenous changes in the second moment of TFP -uncertainty shocks -endogenously generate business cycle fluctuations that account for this negative correlation.
In the model risk-averse managers, in addition to making capital and labor hiring decisions, also decide on what projects to undertake. A managers project choice determines the firm's stochastic TFP process. The critical assumption of this paper is that the menu of project choices, and thus TFP choices, available to the manager lie on a positively sloped mean-variance frontier. High-return projects are also high-risk projects. This generates a risk-return tradeoff for a manager. Whereas choosing a high-return project would, on average, generate more output, and thus profits, it does expose the manager to a higher amount of risk.
The presence of risk-return tradeoffs in the model cause exogenous changes in aggregate uncertainty -uncertainty shocks -to have important effects. Uncertainty shocks alter the riskiness of the project choices available to the manager causing them to reoptimize and adjust their production decisions. For example, as illustrated in Figure 1 , risk-averse managers in the model find that a sudden increase in aggregate uncertainty makes their current project choice too risky, and they thus reoptimize by choosing a low-risk project. The low-risk project is also a low-return/low-TFP project. Consequently, during times of high aggregate uncertainty firm-level production falls, which in turn causes aggregate production to fall. A recession ensues. This mechanism not only qualitatively generates the observed negative correlation between the second moment of TFP and GDP, but is quantitatively also able to explain a significant portion of the variability observed in GDP data. Moreover, this mechanism also generates comovement between consumption and investment; a feature that eludes many real business cycle models driven by second moment shocks.
In addition to generating sizable business cycle fluctuations in real variables, the model in this paper also provides a rich set of results with regard to TFP: (1) As described above an increase in aggregate uncertainty causes managers to endogenously choose low-return/low-TFP projects which in turn results in an endogenous drop in the mean level of aggregate TFP. This result replicates the observed negative correlation between the first and second moments of TFP in the data; (2) In the model, an assumption of heterogeneous risk preferences among the managers generates important heterogeneity in the amount of reoptimization each manager performs in response to changes in aggregate uncertainty. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 1 , during times of high aggregate uncertainty, low risk-averse managers reoptimize their choices very little along the frontier (L to L'), and thus, the average return/TFP level at firms run by low risk-averse managers falls very little during these periods. On the other hand, high risk-averse managers reoptimize significantly in response to high aggregate uncertainty (H to H'), and thus, in high aggregate uncertainty times the average return/TFP level at their firms falls by a significant amount. In the model this heterogeneity in responses causes the cross-sectional variance of firm-level TFP levels -cross-sectional dispersion of TFP -to rise during recessions; an observation that is also true in the data.
The results discussed above when taken together, point to a broader contribution of the model, in that not only does the model explain how uncertainty shocks can lead to economically significant fluctuations in real variables, such as output, consumption, labor hours, and investment, it also provides a structural framework to explain how the various moments of TFP may be related.
In particular, the model shows how a shock to one moment of the aggregate TFP series can propagate through firm-level decisions causing changes to other moments of both the firm-specific and aggregate TFP series. 1 Understanding how exogenous shocks affect the different moments of the TFP series is important because if such shocks cause endogenous movements in TFP then it becomes difficult to disentangle the magnitude of TFP movements in the data that are exogenous vs. endogenous. For example, (1) as seen in the model an exogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty results in an endogenous drop in the first moment of the aggregate TFP process. The model thus suggests that in the data part of the fluctuations in the level of TFP may be purely endogenous and not indicative of the presence of independent exogenous TFP shocks. In my baseline calibration exogenous changes in uncertainty are able to endogenously explain roughly half of the variability in the mean level of TFP in the data; (2) As seen in the model the true magnitude of the exogenous increase in the second moment is endogenously dampened by managers choosing relatively lower risk projects. This dampening effect illustrates how the second moment of TFP in the data can be a systematically biased estimate of the true underlying exogenous uncertainty shock.
Throughout this paper I motivate changes in the mean-variance frontier as resulting from an aggregate second moment shock; however, at this stage it is important to point out that identical changes can also result from a aggregate first moment shock, or a combination of both aggregate first and second moment shocks. This is best seen by looking at Figure 1 . In the figure a positive aggregate uncertainty shock works to move the mean-variance frontier up. This upward movement can alternatively be generated by a negative aggregate first moment shock that would move the frontier left (i.e. up), or can be generated by a combination of negative first and positive second moment shocks. Therefore, the model and its results are truly agnostic about the source of the exogenous shock, and once again aim to highlight the correlated nature of the TFP series and the various identification issues with trying to disentangle the source of exogenous shocks (vs. endogenous movements) in the data.
On the empirical end the paper uses data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and Compustat to document the presence of a positively sloped TFP mean-variance frontier; firms and industries that experience the greatest variation in their TFP growth rates across time, on average are also the ones that have the highest mean TFP growth rates. There exists a positive relationship between the first and second moment of the long-run TFP process. This is an interesting observation because at the business cycle frequency the first and second moments of TFP are negatively correlated. In this paper I take as exogenous the long positive relationship, by allowing firms to choose projects along a positively sloped mean-variance frontier, and provide a theory to explain how this positive relationship in the long run can manifest itself as a negative relationship between the moments of TFP at business cycle frequencies.
In the paper I primarily motivate movements along the empirically observed mean-variance frontier as resulting from managers making different project choices. Alternatively, the reader may also view movements along the frontier as a reduced-form equivalent to other within firm decisions that involve a mean-variance tradeoff. Examples of such micro-level decisions include Narita (2011) who constructs a model where higher uncertainty increases the agency problem. The worsened agency problem leads to less risk taking and the subsequent abandonment of risky projects at the firm-level. Arellano et. al. (2012) show that higher uncertainty can cause firms' to reduce the size of their projects at the micro-level. Panousi & Papanikolaou (2012) empirically document that managers tend to underinvest when faced with increased uncertainty. As a result, the movements along the frontier in this paper can be interpreted in many different ways. The main results of this paper are independent of the interpretation of exactly how the movements along the frontier occur.
The results only depend on the presence of the mean-variance frontier and the risk-return tradeoffs movements along it induce.
With respect to the literature, my paper is related to a recent strand of literature that aims to understand the relationship between economic aggregates and changes in uncertainty. This literature can be roughly divided into two strands. First, a growing literature, studies how exogenous second moment shocks can have first moment effects on economic aggregates. 2 The basic neoclassical model is not particularly conducive to studying the effects of second moment shocks. For small values of household risk aversion the effects of second moment shocks are negligible in the basic neoclassical model, while for high levels of risk aversion (as in Basu & Bundick (2012) ) the effects are not negligible, but then investment and consumption do not comove in response to these shocks -a result which is at odds with the data where there exists strong comovement between consumption and investment. Basu & Bundick (2012) provide a explanation for why the incorrect comovement occurs in the basic neoclassical model. It should be noted here that many models in this literature inherit the negative comovement problem and are either unable to solve it or have to appeal to nominal rigidities or additional real rigidities to generate comovements between consumption and investment. The model in this paper generates this comovement without appealing to any additional rigidities; the comovment between consumption and investment is a natural byproduct of the mechanism in this paper.
The timing of factor input decisions also matters in the basic neoclassical model. If factor input decisions are made after the uncertainty is resolved, for example in the basic model labor decisions are made after observing the current period TFP level, then higher uncertainty results in an expansion -a result which is once again at odds with the data where higher uncertainty is associated with a recession. The reason for this is that for a decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas production, function factor input choices, if made after the uncertainty is resolved, are convex in the TFP level. This result is often referred to as the Oi (1961) , Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) effect. Bloom et. al. (2012) and Bloom (2014) provide a more thorough explanation of this effect.
Next, Bloom (2014) provides a survey of papers in this first strand of the literature. In his survey he further subdivides the first strand into papers that use the real option effect vs. those that use risk aversion and changes in risk-premia to explain how second moments can matter. 
Data
In this section, I first present three stylized facts that my quantitative model will explain. I then also document the existence of an upward sloping mean-variance frontier.
Stylized Facts
In this subsection I document 3 key stylized facts about TFP data:
1. Real GDP and the second moment of the aggregate TFP process are negatively correlated. nous countercyclicality of dispersion in learning, and Decker, D'Erasmo, and Boedoet (2014) who show how market entry/exit decisions can generate output dispersion within a firm. 5 The TFP Series is taken from John Fernald's Website 6 The data sources and explanation can be found in the footnote to the figure. Also, the conditional hetereskedasticity series in panel (b) is a reproduction of a series from Bloom et. al. (2012) , albeit with updated data. 7 Bloom (2014) provides a survey of this evidence.
2. The first and second moments of the aggregate TFP process are negatively correlated. In Table 1 I summarize the various estimates of the correlation between TFP dispersion and output from these papers. 8 
The Mean-Variance Frontier
The key assumption of this paper is that there exists a mean-variance frontier in TFP. In this section I present data and regressions to provide evidence for the existence of this frontier. To statistically verify the observations in Figure 2 , I run a regression of mean TFP growth on the standard deviation of TFP growth. Column (1) in Table 2 presents the results of this regression.
The coefficient on the standard deviation of TFP growth is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A 1 percent increase in the standard deviation of TFP growth in a 4-digit manufacturing industry is associated with an approximately 0.57 percent higher mean TFP growth in the same industry.
Next, to ensure robustness of the result in column (1), in columns (2)- (8) I run a number of regressions with alternative specifications. 10 The baseline regression in column (1) included an intercept term to capture the presence of any aggregate uncertainty that cannot be reduced by moving along the mean-variance frontier. Column (2) drops the intercept term and assumes that all uncertainty can be eliminated by moving along the mean-variance frontier. The coefficient for the standard deviation of TFP growth in this new regression, without the intercept, remains positive and statistically significant.
The regression in column (1) includes all 86 industries and weighs them equally. As Figure   2 illustrates the data does include outliers and the industries vary greatly in size. Column (3) presents a variant of the baseline regression where each observation is weighted by the size of the industry, as measured by the industry's value added. Column (4) presents the baseline regression but without the outliers, and the regression in column (5) both drops the outliers and weighs the observations. In each of these three cases the coefficient for the standard deviation of TFP growth remains positive and statistically significant.
The main motivation for using the 4-digit classification for my baseline regression is that the SIC to NAICS transition in 1997 has led to a discontinuation in data availability for some industries at the 5-and 6-digit level before or after 1997. Column (6) presents the main regression with data at the 6-digit level (industries with missing data are dropped). The coefficient for the standard deviation of TFP growth continues to remain positive and statistically significant. This check provides evidence that the positively sloped mean-variance frontier is a robust feature at lower levels of aggregation as well.
To provide further evidence of the mean-variance frontier at lower levels of aggregation, in industries represent 4-digit NAICS industries with the first two digits being 31-33. TFP growth is aggregated to the 4-digit level by calculating a weighted average of TFP at the 6-digit level. The value added's for each industry at the 6-digit level are used as weights. 10 In addition to the robustness regressions presented here, I also run a number of other robustness regressions that include splitting the samples for before and after the great moderation period, and directly controlling for the value added of the industry in the NBER Sample. In each of these additional robustness regressions the coefficient for the standard deviation of TFP growth is always positive and statistically significant. Unlike the NBER sample, the Compustat sample is not balanced and includes firms of all ages.
In column (8) I only include firms with an age of at least 10 years (i.e. firms that have existed in the compustat sample for 10+ years) and find that the positive sloped frontier is a robust feature of this alternative sample as well.
Model Economy
The model economy consists of risk-averse managers and a representative household.
Risk-Averse Managers/Firms

Production
The model economy is populated by a unit mass of managers that are heterogeneous in their level of risk-aversion. Each of these managers operates a small firm on behalf of the household.
As managers, they have complete control over all production decisions for the firm which include choosing how much labor to hire, how much capital to rent, and what projects to undertake. These production decisions in turn determine the amount of output y i,t , and thus profit π i,t , that is generated by each manager-firm pair i:
with
where k i,t and l i,t give the level of capital and labor employed by the i th manager-firm pair, i,t is the TFP level of the project choice, and w t and r t are the wage and rental rate respectively.
The manager's project choice determines the distribution from which the TFP level (or technology level) for his firm, i,t , is drawn. The various project choices are given along a linear mean-variance frontier and are summarized by the managers choice of the variable µ i,t . A manager that chooses µ i,t , draws his TFP level from a normal distribution with mean 1 + µ i,t and standard deviation (a t + bµ i,t ). As a result the manager faces a trade-off: choosing a high µ i,t results in a 11 The firm level TFP measures are from Ayse Imrohoroglu's website and were used in Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2013). I convert their measures into TFP growth rates for my regression.
higher mean TFP level and thus more output, but this increased output comes at the cost of higher risk. The managers individual risk preference determines his optimal µ i,t choice.
Formally,
where b is the slope of the mean-variance frontier, a t gives a measure of the intercept of the mean-variance frontier, and ω t determines the level of TFP shocks. It is instructive to think of the standard deviation of a firm's TFP process as having two components: (1) An aggregate component, a t ; changes in which effect all manager-firm pairs equally. (2) A firm-specific component, or semiaggregate component, bµ i,t ; which the manager can adjust by choosing µ i,t .
This paper will be interested in how shocks to the aggregate component, a t , effect the model economy. These shocks are often referred to as uncertainty shocks. 12 Consistent with the literature, equation (4) models this uncertainty shock as an AR (1) process.
Manager
Managers in this economy run the firms on behalf of the household and as payment for these services they are entitled to a fraction, λ, of the profits, π i,t , generated by the firm. The manager-firm pairs are single period lived with their period utility maximization problem given as follows: 1314
where consumption, C M i,t , is equal to the managers total compensation:
and his labor,
12 To see why at is analogous to a traditional aggregate uncertainty shock fix the firm-specific choice µi,t = µ, then
. Changes in at now map directly to changes in the standard deviation of the aggregate TFP process. 13 I assume the manager-firm pair is single period lived to make the problem tractable. This assumption makes the managers problem static, which in turn makes the state space for the problem finite. The other positive aspect of this assumption is that when analyzing the model the within period risk effect is not be confounded by the across period precautionary saving motive.
14 Alternatively, I could have assumed that managers are more impatient than the households causing their acrossperiods savings to be zero, or that managers do not have access to an intertemporal saving market. Both of these assumptions would lead to identical end results.
The manager spends a base fixed amount of timeL M providing managerial know-how to the firm. This base amount of time increases if he chooses to alter his firm's TFP choice, µ i,t , from its long-run steady state level,μ i . This second effect on his labor supply is given by the function h(µ i,t ,μ i ). 15 
2 . The inclusion of this convex cost in part ensures that the model does not generate large time-series swings in TFP choices by the managers. Figure 5 illustrates the timeline of managerial decisions: The manager first observes the current state of the aggregate uncertainty, a t , he then makes a TFP choice, µ i,t , following which he observes the TFP, i,t , and subsequently decides on the level of capital, k i,t , and labor, l i,t , to employ at his firm.
Given this timeline of events the manager's optimization decision yields familiar first order conditions with respect to his capital and labor decisions. The manager optimally sets the marginal product of each input equal to the spot price of that input:
These equations can be simplified further to calculate the capital and labor demand for each manager-firm pair:
Whereas the labor and capital decision are completely independent of the functional form of the utility function, the optimal project choice, µ i,t , is not. I must, thus, specify a functional form for utility. I assume that the managers' utility takes the form of standard King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988) preferences:
where γ i is a measure of risk aversion that varies across the different managers and φ is a scale parameter that compares the utility of consumption to the disutility of labor.
Given this utility function the optimal project choice problem can be simplified and written as:
15 Here, h(x, x) = 0, h(x + y, x) > 0 if y = 0, ∂h(x+y,x) ∂y > 0, and
where i,t is given by equation (3).
There is no closed form solution to the problem in (13) . I use numerical methods to solve for the optimal project choice: 16,17
The resulting optimal project choice function, µ(γ i , a t ), has two properties:
indicates that a higher level of risk aversion leads to a lower µ i,t choice; agents with a high level of risk aversion forgo drawing from a high mean distribution in order to be able to draw from a low risk distribution. µ at ≤ 0 indicates that in times of high aggregate uncertainty the managers attempt to reduce risk by choosing a low µ i,t . A low µ i,t choice reduces the firm-specific component of the risk at the cost of an on average lower TFP draw.
Household
The model economy is also populated with a standard neoclassical representative household that maximizes its lifetime utility:
subject to the following period budget constraint
where C H t , K t , and L H t give the levels of consumption, capital, and labor respectively. w t and r t are the wage and rental rate. δ is the depreciation rate, and Π t is the total profits reimbursed by the managers to the household.
The household, similar to the managers, also has King−Plosser−Rebelo (1988) preferences given by:
here because the household makes intertemporal decisions, σ captures not only the risk preferences of the household, the inverse of σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 16 The long-run steady state level,μi, is fully determined by γi and thus I do not include it as a separate argument of the optimal project choice function µ(•, •)
17 I explain the numerical solution method in appendix A.
The resulting first order conditions for household are standard and can be simplified and written as:
Market Clearing and Aggregate Variables
In equilibrium, wages, w t , and the rental rates, r t , are such that the markets for labor and capital clear. These market clearing conditions are given as follows:
with i,t given by (3) and the market for goods automatically clears due to Walras' Law.
Also, in equilibrium the aggregate levels of capital and labor are given by K t and L t = L H t in equations (19) and (20), and the aggregate levels of output, consumption, and profits reimbursed to the household, are calculated as follows:
The level of aggregate TFP, the standard deviation of aggregate TFP, and the cross-sectional dispersion of mean level of TFP are given as:
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is described as a set of firm specific variable, (3), (7), (8), (11), (12), (14), (16), (17), (18), (19) , (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26) , and L t = L H t are satisfied. Table 3 presents the parameter values used in the baseline simulations.
Calibration
The model is solved at a quarterly frequency. I set the household's subjective discount factor, β = 0.985, to generate an annual subjective discount factor of roughly 0.94. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to a standard value of σ = 1. 18 I pick φ such that the household spends 0.25 of its time working in steady state. Finally, the depreciation rate is set at 0.025 to generate an annual capital depreciation rate of 10%.
For the firm I set the capital and labor shares to α = 0.25 and η = 0.5. This is consistent with the observation that the ratio of labor to capital share in data is approximately 2 and the average marginal cost markup in the model economy, consistent with estimates in the data, is approximately 33%.
I choose the distribution of risk-aversion across managers to be a truncated normal. 19 To calibrate a truncated normal I need to specify four statistics of the distribution, the minimum, the maximum, the mean, and the standard deviation. I choose these four statistics to generate a set of the values of σ a = 0.0075 and ρ a = 0.94 such that the standard deviation and autocorrelation of the second moment of aggregate TFP in the data match those generated from simulations of the model.
Results
In this section I begin by discussing how my model can explain both the business cycle moment and the 3 stylized facts. I then briefly explain how the model highlights issues with measuring first and second moment TFP shocks directly from the data. I close with a robustness exercise on the free parameter.
For the results in this section I solve the model by first simplifying it and rewriting it as a value function. I then use function iteration to find a numerical estimate of this value function. In turn, I use the resulting value function estimate to create policy rules which help me both construct impulse responses and calculate the moments for key variables. The impulse responses presented in this section are for a two standard deviation shock to aggregate uncertainty, a t , and the moments are calculated to only measure the effects of changes in aggregate uncertainty, a t . The exact details of the solution method and how the impulse responses and moments are calculated can be found in appendix A. Figure 6 presents the impulse responses of key variables in the model to a 2 standard deviation (+2 std) shock to aggregate uncertainty, a t . As can be seen in the figure an aggregate uncertainty shock causes the standard deviation of the aggregate TFP process to rise, while the aggregate output and mean of the aggregate TFP process fall.
Main Simulation
In the model higher aggregate uncertainty induces the risk-averse managers to endogenously move along the mean-variance frontier by altering their project choice and thereby reducing the firm-specific component of uncertainty. Due to the positively sloped nature of the mean-variance frontier the reduction in the firm-specific component of uncertainty comes at the cost of a lowermean TFP process at each firm. The lower-mean TFP process at the firm level aggregates to a lower aggregate mean TFP (panel (d) of Figure 6 ). Also, the lower-mean TFP at each firm reduces production at the firm level which in turn aggregates to lower aggregate output in the economy (panel (b) of Figure 6 ). In this way endogenous movements along the mean-variance frontier cause uncertainty shocks to have a negative effect on both output and the mean level of TFP.
To highlight the importance of endogenous movements along the mean-variance in my model, in Figure 6 I also plot the impulse responses for a model identical to the baseline model, but one where managers cannot endogenously choose projects and move along the mean-variance frontier.
In this latter model the managers' firm-specific component of uncertainty is fixed at the steady state level. Increases in aggregate uncertainty in this model cause the standard deviation of TFP to rise more than the baseline model because managers are unable to dampen the risk they face by moving along the mean-variance frontier. Also, if the managers cannot endogenously move along the frontier then the mean level of TFP remains constant, and with the mean level of TFP constant output in this model does not fall. Instead, due to the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect output rises in this model. In the model factor input decisions are made after the uncertainty is resolved (see Figure   5 ) and as a result for a fixed wage rate and rental rate the optimal labor and capital levels at the firm-level, equations (11) and (12), are convex in the level of TFP, i,t . This convexity in the TFP level causes capital and labor, and thus output, to rise in times of high aggregate uncertainty. A positive correlation between output and uncertainty is at odds with the data (see Figure 3) . 22 Table 4 presents the data moments and model generated moments for output and TFP for the My results are consistent with these additional stylized fact as well. Finally, panel (c) of Figure 7 presents the impulse response of TFP dispersion to an uncertainty shock.
On the broader business-cycle facts: Figure 8 plots the impulse responses of consumption, labor for the household, and investment, to a +2 std shock to aggregate uncertainty, a t . Consumption, labor for the household, and investment all fall in response to an increase in aggregate uncertainty. 23 Increases in aggregate uncertainty thus do generate an economy wide recession in my model. This is not true of all models in this literature; a number of models when driven by uncertainty shocks are unable to generate the empirically observed positive comovement between consumption and investment. Furthermore, unlike the model of this paper, models that do generate comovement in response to uncertainty shocks often need to rely on additional rigidities. The correlation of consumption and investment in my baseline model is 0.51, as compared to approximately 0.7 in the data.
In addition to generating the correct qualitative responses the model is also able to generate relatively sizable business cycle fluctuations. Table 5 compares the data and model generated moments. As can be seen in this table the model is able to explain roughly half of the variability in output, consumption, and investment, and a little under a quarter of the variability in labor hours.
As a result, the model predicts that uncertainty shocks through endogenous movements along a mean-variance frontier can explain a significant portion of the U.S. business cycle fluctuations. As seen in the same table the model also does a good job of matching the relative standard deviations, autocorrelations, and correlations with GDP of the main aggregate variables.
Identification of First and Second Moment TFP Shocks in the Data
The endogenous nature of project and thus TFP choices in this paper helps sheds light on measurement issues related to (1) identifying first moment shocks in the data and (2) measuring the magnitude of second moment shocks.
As discussed previously, in the model a change in the aggregate uncertainty causes managers to reoptimize along the mean-variance frontier, which in turn endogenously causes the aggregate level of TFP to change. Figure 9 plots the endogenous relationship between the aggregate uncertainty and the level of TFP in the model. This relationship highlights the problem with using raw moments of the TFP data to identify exogenous TFP shocks. As in the model, in the data it is possible that part of the observed movements in aggregate TFP are actually endogenous in nature, and not indicative of an exogenous first moment shock. For example, my model, at the baseline calibration, is able to endogenously generate roughly half of the variation in the mean level of TFP data through uncertainty shocks alone (See Table 4 ). 24 Furthermore, this result also highlights the possibility that the observed negative correlation between the time series of the first and second moment of TFP is not coincidental, but structural in nature. Therefore, it is important that this negative 23 I should note that as seen in panel (d) of Figure 8 the managers' hours in the model do indeed increase in response to higher aggregate uncertainty. However, this change is not important for the models aggregate implications because the magnitude of this movement in hours is negligible 24 Alternatively, under an interpretation where exogenous changes in the first moment cause the mean-variance frontier to move, this result can be reinterpreted as a first moment shock endogenously causing second moment movements, thereby shedding light on issues with measuring second moment shocks directly from TFP data.
correlation be allowed for in models that attempt to jointly estimate the effects of first vs. second moment shocks. 25 Next, in the model endogenous TFP choices by managers along the TFP mean-variance frontier act to dampen the effect of increased aggregate uncertainty and magnify the effect of low aggregate uncertainty. In panel (b) of Figure 9 I plot how different levels of aggregate uncertainty manifest themselves in the model. In times of both relatively low and relatively high uncertainty the actual shock to the economy is quite different than the shock measured from the data. This shows that using second moments of TFP data to measure second moment shocks can lead to a systematic mismeasurement of the true magnitude of these shocks. It is important to correctly measure the magnitude of the true underlying second moment shock because a mismeasured shock can cause models to erroneously conclude the lack of, or over-importance of, second moment shocks in the data. For example, in this paper's model firms run by low risk-averse managers face the full magnitude of the uncertainty shock, and thus any mismeasurement of the true magnitude of the uncertainty shock will be unable to explain the behavior of these firms. In the model the true magnitude of second moment shocks predicts important heterogeneities in uncertainty faced by the cross-section of firms which a mismeasured shock might miss.
In conclusion, the model highlights issues with naively measuring first and second moment shocks directly from TFP data.
Robustness
In calibrating the baseline model I treated τ and λ as free parameters. Here I provide sensitivity analysis with respect to both τ and λ. 26 Recall that τ parameterizes the convex labor cost a manager must pay to move along mean-variance frontier and λ gives the managers share of profits.
In Table 4 I report the real GDP and TFP moments and in Figure 10 I illustrate the crosssectional changes for models with the baseline value of τ (= 5), 150% of the baseline value of τ (= 7.5), and 50% of the baseline value of τ (= 2.5). As can be seen for both when τ is 50% higher and when τ is 50% lower the model is able to qualitatively explain all three stylized facts. The first two stylized fact can be seen in Table 4 where for τ = 2.5 and τ = 7.5 the second moment of TFP is negatively correlated with both output and the first moment of TFP . The last facts can be seen in Figure 10 where for both new τ values the TFP dispersion increases in response to an increase in aggregate uncertainty.
The model, however, is unable to qualitatively replicate the stylized facts for extreme value 25 This result is in line with Bachmann and Bayer (2013) who find that allowing for correlations between first and second-moment shocks allows their model to better explain the data. 26 For the sensitivity analysis I provide partial derivative exercises in that I do not recalibrate the model after changing the parameter value. The main reason for doing this is that for very low values of τ numerical simulations show the standard deviation of the second moment of aggregate TFP from the model is strictly bounded below its target value in the data, thus making it impossible to calibrate a model with low τ to match that data moment. of τ . 27 When τ = ∞ the model reduces to one where there are no endogenous choices thereby eliminating the main channel through which increases in aggregate uncertainty have a negative effect on the mean level of TFP and output. On the other hand when τ = 0 the risk-averse manager is very responsive to changes in aggregate uncertainty. In particular for τ = 0, if aggregate uncertainty, a t , increases the manager dampens the uncertainty so much that he optimally chooses a TFP process that has both a lower-mean and lower-standard deviation than before. This effect can be illustrated as the medium risk-averse manager moving to H instead of M in Figure 1 . As a result, when τ = 0, even though an exogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty does cause a recession, due to the extreme endogenous movements the measured second moment of aggregate TFP decreases in response to an exogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty, a t .
In summary, my model is able to qualitatively replicate the three stylized facts as long as the value of τ is neither too close to 0 nor too close to ∞. However, it should be noted that at lower values of τ the model is able to explain a larger fraction of business cycle fluctuations in real variables (see Table 5 ). This is because as τ falls the marginal cost of moving along the meanvariance frontier falls, which in turn causes the mean level of TFP, and thus real variables, to be more responsive to changes in aggregate uncertainty. The downside of the managers being more responsive is that at lower values of τ the movements in the second moment of TFP are significantly endogenously dampened, thus decreasing the models ability to match the standard deviation of the second moment of aggregate TFP in data.
Next, the managers share of profits, λ, mainly acts as a scale parameter in the model. Note that equation (13) does not depend on the value of λ and thus TFP choices and moments remain unaltered as the value of λ changes (see Table 5 ). Theoretically, the one place where large changes in λ can have a significant effect is on the aggregate consumption series. The managers' consumption depends directly on their share of profits which in turn depend on λ. As λ increases the managers' consumption both increases in absolute terms and as a share of total consumption. As a result, at very high values of λ the aggregate consumption series mimics the moments of the managers' consumption series in place of the households consumption series. The managers' consumption series is more volatile than the household because in the model the managers do not have access to an intertemporal saving instrument. In Table 5 I report the case where λ = 0.25, as compared to 0.1 in the baseline calibration. For λ = 0.25 the second moment of consumption does increase, however, the change is unobservable up to the first decimal place. As a result the main results of the model are essentially unaltered by picking a different calibration of λ.
Conclusion
In this paper I show how changes in aggregate uncertainty -uncertainty shocks -can generate business cycle fluctuations. Uncertainty shocks in my model are able to account for a significant portion of the observed variation in aggregate GDP. The main innovation of the paper is that it documents the presence of a positively sloped mean-variance TFP frontier and and then constructs a model that allows agents to endogenously choose projects with different TFP processes along this frontier. In the model economy an increase in aggregate uncertainty induces the firms to adopt projects that exhibit lower firm-specific risk. However, low-risk projects along the positively sloped frontier are also low-return projects. As a result when firms adopts these project their production falls. In this way, increases in aggregate uncertainty in the model generate sizable recessions.
The model economy is also able to account for a number of stylized facts. At the aggregate level, the model generates a negative correlation between the second moment of TFP and GDP, and between the first and second moments of TFP. Cross-sectionally, the model generates increased TFP dispersion during recessions.
Finally, the paper highlights some measurement issues. These include: (1) the second moment of TFP in the data may be a systematically downward biased estimates of uncertainty shocks during recessions and an upward biased estimate during expansions; (2) Uncertainty shocks can generate TFP dynamics that mimic traditional first moment shocks, and thus changes in the level of TFP in the data may be driven by second moment shocks. This latter result gives evidence that first and second moments shocks in the data may be endogenously correlated and thus any joint estimation of these shocks in the data must allow for this correlation.
With uncertainty shocks gaining a lot more interest as drivers of the business cycle, it is important to be able to correctly measure them, develop models that illustrate the channels through which they work, and to understand how the various aggregate and cross-sectional notions of TFP moments may be related. This paper sheds light on all these issues.
Next, to solve the bellman equation I need to solve for the functionŨ (K t , K t+1 ; a t , ω t ). To find this function, I first find the function µ(γ i , a t ) and then use this to evaluate the integrals in (A. Once I have solved for the value function, I use it to construct the policy function, K t+1 (K t ; a t , ω t ), on the same 500x17x11 grid in the (K, a, ω) dimensions. I then use this policy function, along with the discretized a t and ω t processes to simulate the time series for K t , a t , and ω t . The variable K t , a t , and ω t together fully describe the state of the economy and thus I can use their simulated values to calculate the time series for other aggregate variables.
In the results section I present both impulse response functions and moments from my simulations. To calculate the moments, and specifically to isolate the effects of a t on the moments, I simulate the economy for 2300 periods with both a t and ω t shocks. I then repeat this exercise 120,000 times keeping the a t shocks the same but allowing the ω t shocks to be different across simulations. I then average across these 120,000 simulation exercises to produce a 2300 period simulation that is relatively purified of the effects of ω t shocks. Next, I drop the first 300 periods of this 2300 period simulation and use the remaining 2000 periods to calculate the moments. Dropping the first 300 periods allows the economy to settle into its stochastic steady state.
To calculate the impulse responses I simulate the economy for 360 periods with both a t and ω t shocks. I force a t to be +2 std from the mean in period 310. I repeat this exercise 3 million times over different realizations of a t and ω t shocks each time and calculate the impulse response as the average of these 3 million simulations. The figures in the paper plot periods 309 through 330 of these impulse responses and label period 310, the period of the shock, as 0. Note: In the regressions above a NAICS digit level of 4 implies 4-digit level data was used conditional on the first two digits being 31-33 (Manufacturing). TFP growth for higher levels of aggregation was calculated yearly as a weighted average of TFP growth at the 6-digit NAICS level. The weighting was done by the value-added of the 6-digit industry for that year. For regressions (4) and (5) outliers are dropped. An outlier here is defined as any point ±1.5 standard deviations from the mean of either the dependent or independent variable. Industries for which data was not available prior to 1997 were dropped for the NAICS 6-digit level regression above. Note: All data is calculated as a percentage deviations from HP trend with a smoothing factor of 1600.
Note: Model moments are calculated to only capture the effects of changes in a t and the model moments for hours are for the household only. Also, τ = ∞ gives the no endogenous choice case. 
